This paper investigates the mechanism(s) through which a large exogenous shock in income affects the investment parents make in child development. The identification strategy exploits the random assignment of a conditional cash transfer program in rural Nicaragua whose objective was to benefit households with very young children. Payments were allocated to mothers who were also subject to repeated information on the importance of varied diets, health and education matters.
Introduction
The recent literature has assessed a positive causal effect of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs on child well-being in developing countries (Fernand et al., 2008 ; Paxon and Schady, 2010; Macours et al., 2012) , but little emphasis has been placed on the mechanisms behind this effect. However, the design and success of policies aimed at improving child development depends crucially on how and why parents respond to them. Possible mechanisms through which CCT programs may operate include income effects, increases in knowledge, or changes in family dynamics such as increased bargaining power of the cash recipient. In the present paper we take the rich dataset provided in Macours et al. (2012) and investigate which of these mechanisms explain the improvement in child development observed in their estimates. Differently from these authors, we argue that the results are largely explained by an income effect. Changes in knowledge toward child rearing practices are also evident, which was advocated by the authors as well. However, both mechanisms are effective only for those children whose mother was likely to be already powerful at the baseline. Shifts in bargaining power favouring mothers are instead absent. In light of the theoretical model that guides the empirical analysis, we can interpret these results as the mother having a larger marginal willingness to pay for children. However, this difference in preferences starts to play a role only when she is already powerful, because in this case she is more capable of using at best the additional resources that are made at her disposal. These results have strong policy implications, because if the subsidy was given only to families where the mother was less educated than the father, we would have observed no program impacts.
The question of whether and to what extent cash transfers improve child development has been studied only recently in three papers. Fernand et al. (2008) find that the cash transfer component of the Mexican PROGRESA is associated with better outcomes in child health, growth, and development. Paxon and Schady (2010) exploit random assignment in the roll-out of the Bono de Desarollo Human in Ecuador and find that this program had positive effects on the physical, cognitive and socio-emotional development of children, particularly poorer ones. Macours et al. (2012) provide the cleanest and richest estimates of the causal relationship of interest. They estimate the impact of Atención a Crisis (AAC), a cash transfer program implemented in rural Nicaragua to improve the development in early childhood of poor children. They show that children in households of the treatment group had significantly higher levels of well-being proxied by a rich variety of measures. Although a positive relationship between cash transfers and child development in poor households might be expected, the mechanism through which this occurs is much less obvious but important for program design.
A variety of reasons may explain how such policies affect the investment parents make in child development. Under the umbrella of the neoclassical (unitary) representation of the household, parents maximize a joint utility function subject to a budget constraint (Becker, 1991 ). An exogenous increase in income leads to a relaxation of the budget constraint, which in turn allows the household to move along the Engel curve and to change the composition of their expenditure. Hence the observed improvement in child development may simply be explained by an income effect: richer households can afford more nutritious foods, early stimulation and health care, and this results in improvements in child development. An alternative explanation is that the social marketing of the program may have transmitted knowledge about child-rearing practices and induced a different behaviour by parents. In other words, beneficiary households were told that transfers were made for the specific reason of improving the diversity and nutrient content of children's diet and to buy school material. Knowledge acquisition and preference change enhanced through social interactions with other program beneficiaries may have affected parents' behaviour toward their children (Macours and Vakis, 2009 ).
In the framework above, neither the source nor the recipient of the additional income matter for the allocation of household resources. However, a large and growing literature shows that the unitary model is unfit to study household decisions. First of all, it is often observed that households do not behave as a single unit where a benevolent dictator makes decisions optimal for every member. On the contrary, decisions on how to allocate resources are affected by each member's bargaining power, which is a clear violation of the unitary model of the household (e.g. Attanasio and Lechene, 2002) . Moreover, when the shift of resources favours mothers, this is usually associated with greater benefits for the children (Lundberg et 1 . This suggests that the gender of recipients of cash transfers, like those made by the CCT programs used to estimate our causal relationship of interest, may also be important in determining how parents have changed their behaviour. In particular, if mothers have stronger taste for child well-being, cash transfers targeted to them may also improve child well-being by improving the mother's bargaining position in the family and so inducing a pattern of expenditures that better reflects her preference structure. In order to investigate which mechanism(s) may drive an improvement in child development, we exploit the experimental set-up of a conditional cash transfer program that The present paper is linked to four streams of literature. The first is the literature on intra-household bargaining, which suggests that man and woman do not share the same preferences. Several papers show that mothers allocate resources under their control towards goods that improve their child well-being (Lundberg et Rubalcava et al., 2009 ). With respect to this literature, we show that, while mothers indeed have a larger marginal willingness to pay for their children, in a developing country context this may be observed only when she has a sufficiently large decision making power in the household. This finding is in line with previous evidence by Gitter and Barham (2008) . The second stream is the treatment effect literature of CCT programs, which aims to identify empirical facts about how to obtain desired results. One of the focuses of this literature is to establish whether, why and to what extent targeting conditional cash transfers to women is effective (Yoong et al. (2012) for a systematic review). With respect to this literature we argue that CCTs may be effective as long as some initial conditions are satisfied, like a balancing power at the baseline favouring mothers. Next, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate on whether CCT programs are actually able to improve woman's bargaining power within the household by increasing their control over economic resources. A recent review by Van den Bold et al. (2013) finds no consensus on this matter. We contribute to the debate by arguing that, at least for a short term intervention aimed at improving child development, there is no evidence supporting a shift in decision-making power. Finally, the paper is linked to the literature on family influence on child outcomes. A large body of research initiated by Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986 ) emphasized the importance of family income constraints and heritability as the principle sources of parental influence on child development. Recent findings, summarized in Cunha et al. (2006) , presents a richer picture of how parents may affect their children. The emerging framework recognizes that genes and environments provided by the parents affect both cognitive and noncognitive abilities. With respect to this literature we focus on parents' heterogeneous preferences and bargaining power as a source of parental influence. A possible implication of our results is that parents' decision making process must be taken into account in modelling childhood skill formation in order to avoid undesirable policy designs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the theoretical framework that motivates the empirical analysis. In Section 3 we discuss the data of the welfare program that we use. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical strategy. In Section 5 we present the results of the paper and the robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
5
In this section, we discuss the theoretical set-up of individuals' interactions within the household. The effect of cash transfers on child development is rationalized within a model of the household with multiple decision makers. The collective model, pioneered by Chiappori (1988; 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988) , and subsequently elaborated by Browning et al. (1994) , Browning and Chiappori (1998) , Blundell et al. (2005) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) , has emerged as the most appropriate framework to study household allocation decisions 2 .
Consider a static model of the household with two decision makers and children, where the latter are not part of the decision making process. Each parent's preferences are assumed to be representable by a continuously differentiable and strictly concave utility map u i , i = m, f , where m stands for mother and f for father. As a consequence, demand functions derived from these utilities are continuously differentiable. This means that in our framework no restriction is placed on preferences, beyond assuming that they can be represented by a "smooth" utility function for each adult in the household. Parents derive utility from two Hicksian composite goods: c denotes the ("standard") private and public consumption goods and c θ denotes those goods that are effective at improving child development θ. c θ might include general expenditure on children (e.g. clothes, toys, etc), it enters in the utility function of the parents as public good and can be thought of as a set of inputs which "produce" child well-being. Hence θ might be interpreted as a result of a joint investment in a good which has public good features 3 .
The budget constraint of the family is:
where p c θ is the price vector that parents have to pay to buy inputs for the production of child well-being, and x can be considered either as total income or, as in standard cross-sectional analysis, as total household expenditure. We assume that the utility of the decision makers is separable in consumption:
where parents have the same preferences over consumption, whereas they obtain different benefit α i by investing in their child's well-being 4 . The vector d and represent, respec- 3 Note that modelling parents' decision on children well-being in a static framework is equivalent to assuming that parents decide for this period's well-being as if there were no future for the children. This is a restrictive assumption in general, but it becomes more realistic if in our analysis we focus on poor or constrained households. 4 The assumption of parents having common preferences over consumption is not necessary for the 6 tively, a set of demographic characteristics, called a preference shifter, and unobserved heterogeneity in individual and household characteristics. The separability assumption does not only make the notation more convenient, it has also realistic bite. Indeed, we are implicitly excluding the possibility that parent i can reach the same level of utility by substituting "standard" consumption goods with those goods that improve specifically the well-being of their children. The two bundles are of different nature and serve different purposes and this fact is taken into account by the form of the utility function. Following the literature on collective models, we assume that the decisions made by the parents are Pareto efficient 5 . This implies that households choose how to allocate their income to different consumption goods by solving the following problem:
subject to the budget constraint (1) . In this problem λ ∈ [0, 1] is the bargaining weight, also known as Pareto weight, which can be seen as a measure of the distribution of resources between the two spouses. In its most general form, λ depends on (p θ , x, z), where z is a vector of distribution factors. These are crucial variables that affect the allocation of resources exclusively by changing the relative weights of the two parents within the household (λ and (1 -λ) in equation (3) above).
For an internal solution, replace (2) into (3). The problem leads to the following FOCs:
We replace (4) into (5) to obtain the standard (Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson) condition of efficient public consumption levels:
If we define Φ i =
as the marginal willingness to pay of parent i for children wellpurpose of the exercise but it allows us to derive an optimal allocation rule that captures in a straightforward way all the main mechanisms of interest. More general assumptions are also possible but they would not improve our understanding of the empirical results. 5 This is a testable assumption within a collective model and in principle it could also be tested in our context. Unfortunately the dataset does not contain the necessary information to run a test of collective efficiency. However, two recent papers by Bobonis (2009) and Attanasio and Lechene (2014) show that, in a context very similar to ours, households make collective efficient use of resources coming from a conditional cash transfers program similar to AAC. Although this is only an indirect evidence that our households make also efficient use of this cash, it tells us that assuming efficiency is not unreasonable.
being, then we can re-write the allocation rule in a convenient way:
The latter is the household's inverse demand function for those goods that enhance children welfare. It tells us that parents invest in goods that improve child well-being up to the point in which the weighted sum of their marginal willingness to pay for these goods equal their price. If the household is subject to a positive income shock, this changes their consumption of c and in turn their contribution to c θ , depending on their bargaining power.
The link between this theoretical explanation and a welfare program such as AAC is threefold, one for each mechanism that we wish to investigate. First, the grant provided to families increases their non-labor income and this affects directly the budget constraint which allows them to afford more c θ . This channel can be rationalized both in a collective model, where λ has a functional dependence, and in the classic unitary model, where λ is either fixed or equal to one. If we assume that each decision maker's power λ is fixed, then we can see program (3) as a problem faced by a unique entity that maximizes a weighted sum of individual preferences. Alternatively, if the decision power is in the hand of one individual (e.g. λ = 1), the dictator can be benevolent and positively value the consumption bundle of the other household members. If the unitary model rationalizes households' decisions, after controlling for total resources we should not observe any residual impact coming from the grant. This is commonly referred as the "income pooling" hypothesis which offers a straightforward testable implication of the unitary model. Let z T be the eligibility to the program and indicate x m and x f as the monetary contribution that each parent brings to the family. The theoretical prediction is that:
In other words, the effect of some exogenous income shock on the kth measure of child well-being is the same regardless of whom benefit from the increase of resources. If instead, after conditioning on total resources, which includes also those coming from the program, AAC has a further impact on the allocation of goods, it has to be because, either or both, of the following mechanisms also play a role. Second, the grant might change parents' preferences or knowledge about child rearing. This corresponds to an increase in the taste parameter α i , which is present both in the collective and unitary representations of the household, and which would lead to an increase in the demand for c θ .
Third, the targeting of mothers might lead to a change in the balance of power within the household, hence equation (7) can be used to understand such an impact on the demand for child well-being. This last mechanism is missing in the unitary model and reflects the richness of the alternative collective representation.
To further elaborate on the latter channel, note that the AAC grant generates an exogenous increase in the relative income in the household, xm x f , a standard distribution factor. In the literature this is associated with an increase in the bargaining power of the member who benefits from this allocation. In other words, we are assuming that for the households eligible to receive the grant:
Under this assumption, and using the implicit function theorem, we can derive the effect on the welfare of the children induced by a change in λ:
where µ > 0. Hence targeting the transfers to the mother is beneficial for child well-being as long as she has stronger preferences for children:
Net of the income effect and the change in preferences or knowledge induced by AAC, if we observe a further positive increase in child well-being of targeted households, we can rationalize this by a change in the Pareto weight induced by the program. Interestingly, the model indicates that this would be attributed to a different marginal propensity to pay for their welfare with respect to consumption among decision makers.
Before concluding this section, two important remarks on the theoretical interpretation are in order. First, in the formalization of the household's program (3), we do not model labour supply and the individual wage earned by each parent. For simplicity, we assume that there is a total amount of resources available, x, and each parent takes a portion of this "cake" according to their bargaining power within the household. As it will be explained later, the separability of labour supply with respect to consumption is not a restrictive assumption in our specific context, and in any case we test its validity in the robustness checks. Second, collective models are commonly applied on data of market consumption goods, such as food or non-food items, which can be defined in terms of precise quantity and price. In this paper, the vector of goods c θ is not the standard share of children expenditure over total expenditure, but rather a set of general inputs into the production of child development. Moreover, θ is a vector of ten standardized measures of well-being taken on each child. This latter approach is followed also by e.g. Duflo (2003) and LaFave and Thomas (2013) . Although it is not conventional in the collective literature, ours is not an unreasonable approach as we maintain the common assumptions that the utility functions of the parents are quasi-concave, non-decreasing and strictly-increasing in at least one argument.
Data
The dataset we use is suitable for a variety of reasons. First, it was collected to evaluate the impact of a welfare program whose objective was to improve early childhood development. The program was introduced as a conditional cash transfer, where the main conditions were to send young children to regular health checks and to enrol them in primary school. However, given that the take up rate was almost 100%, the program can actually be considered to be unconditional. Second, the evaluation design was based on a rigorous randomization and it involved the collection of high quality surveys. Importantly, most of the information collected on child well-being are observed, rather than parents-reported. This is important because it reduces the probability of having biased measures. Moreover, it contains various information on the child rearing practices of parents and on the inputs used to produce child development. Third, since transfers were made to women, we can use this information to test whether the program shifted the balance of power within the household. Finally, the sample is large enough to have a sufficient number of households headed by a single mother to allow us to test whether other mechanisms, besides the shift in bargaining power, play a role. In this section, we provide some background information on the program and the evaluation surveys and present descriptive statistics of the sample adopted in our empirical analysis.
Program design
Atención a Crisis (AAC) is a program implemented between November 2005 and December 2006 by the Ministry of the Family in six municipalities in rural Nicaragua. From its start, AAC was a subject of a rigorous evaluation based on random assignment. Of all communities in the 6 municipalities, 106 communities were included in the evaluation sample, 56 as treatment and the remaining 50 as control. The beneficiary of the program randomly received one of the following three packages. Group 1 was offered a conditional cash transfer (CCT) conditional on children receiving regular health checks and attending primary school. Group 2 was offered the CCT plus the possibility for one household member to attend a vocational training course offered at the municipal headquarters. Households in this treatment group could also participate in labor market and business-skill training workshops organized in their own community. Group 3 was offered the CCT plus a large lump-sum payment to start a small non-agricultural activity. This grant was conditional on developing a business plan.
The design of AAC was modelled following an earlier CCT program implemented in Nicaragua, the Red de Protecion Social (RPS) (see Maluccio and Flores, 2005) . The transfers were paid to the "titular", or primary child care-giver, every two months. This was the mother in the vast majority of the cases. The main component of the transfers for all groups was conditional on regular preventive health checks. However, in practice, receiving the transfer was unconditional because the conditionality was not monitored, and households were not penalized for non-compliance. The additional educational transfer for households with children aged 7-15 who had not finished primary school, was also conditional on school enrolment and regular attendance. This conditionality was actually monitored in practice. The basic component of the transfer for all households in the treatment groups was large, corresponding to 15% of their yearly per capita expenditures, approximately US$ 145. Households with children between 7-15 enrolled in primary school received in addition US$ 90 per household and an additional US$ 25 per child. Households eligible for the lump-sum payment were eligible to a further US$ 200, conditional on having developed the business plan and started the activity that was planned. This means that households in Group 3 were eligible for cash transfers equivalent to 26% of their annual expenditures. Finally, the program included repeated information on the importance of varied diets, health and education matters. These communications were meant to change their consumption and investment behaviours.
The program take-up rate was high. More than 95% of households complied to the program and contamination of the control was negligible. The main reasons households did not take up the program was due to the fact that there was some disagreement with local leaders in the assignment of some families who were first considered non-eligible. The rest of the non-compliance is explained by the fact that some households migrated out of the communities after the baseline survey.
Evaluation sample
The dataset is composed of three data points: one pre-treatment, in April/May 2005, and two post-treatment, in July/August 2006 and between August 2008 and May 2009. The pre-treatment information were used to define the eligibility to AAC. Only 10% of households in treatment and control communities, and 5% of those with children under 6 years of age, were ineligible for the program because they had a level of expenditure above the predefined threshold. The first follow-up survey was collected nine months after the eligible households had started receiving payments. Whereas the second follow-up was collected when households had stopped receiving transfers for an average of 2 years. The original sample includes 3.002 eligible households in the treatment group and 1.019 eligible households assigned to the control group. The attrition rate over the study period was very low: 1.3% in 2006 and 2.4% in 2008. Macours et al. (2012) provide detailed information on causes and concerns of the attrition rates in their online Appendix 2. In general, they show that attrition is uncorrelated with treatment status and it does not differ across treatment packages.
The surveys include detailed information on expenditures at household level 6 , and ex- 6 The modules on expenditure information were taken from the 2001 Nicaragua Living Standards 11 tensive information on child development. There are up to 10 measures of early childhood well-being, depending on the age of the children. For all children between 0-72 months, there are information on standard measures of well-being such as the Weight-for-Age and Height-for-Age z-scores. Moreover, there are information on social-personal, language, fine motor and gross motor skills assessed using 4 sub-tests of the Denver Development Screening Test (Frankenberg and Dodds, 1996) . For each subset, the child is asked to perform a number of age-specific tasks. If the child fails to perform a task which 75% of the children in the age-group can perform, the test falls back to easier tasks up to the point where the child can successfully perform it. Only when the task cannot be observed directly is the caregiver asked about the ability of the child to perform them. For children aged 36 months or older, there are 4 additional measures available. The first one is a measure of child cognitive development, the TVIP. This is the Spanishspeaking version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), i.e. a test of receptive vocabulary (Dunn et al., 1986 ). There are two tests from the McCarthy test battery, one on short term memory and one leg motor (Boivin et al., 1995). Finally, the Behavioural Problem Index (BPI), which is based on the parents' report of the frequency that a child displays each of 29 problematic behaviours with responses coded as "never", "sometimes" and "often" (Baker and Mott, 1989) . The dataset reports the number of behavioural problems for which a parent answers "often". Further details of all these tests are provided in the online Appendix 3 of Macours et al. (2012) . As they explain at length, all these tests were piloted in the field and adjustments were made when necessary. Many of these tests have already been applied in similar populations in Latin America, also in the context of a conditional cash transfer program such as in Mexico (see Fernand et al., 2008) and Ecuador (see Paxson and Schady, 2010) .
The follow-up surveys include additional information on various measures of inputs or stimulation into the production function of child well-being. These include food and nonfood expenditures, home production, food consumed outside the home, child food intake, items available to the children, and whether parents spend qualitative time with them in various forms. There are also information on parents' mental health and preventive health care measures. Table 1 and 2 of Macours et al. (2012) summarize baseline characteristics of households and children in the whole sample. The important feature of these tables is that they show that the randomization was well conducted. Given that our empirical analysis will be based on a sub-sample of the original sample, in the next section we only provide information of the sample used in this paper in order not to be repetitive and to show that even after selecting a sub-sample, the features of the random assignment are maintained.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
In order to have an homogeneous sample on which we can test the mechanisms of interest, we select a sub-sample that satisfy the following restrictions. First, households are composed only by natural parents and any number of children in all three surveys. This means that households with at least one other adult member are excluded. Second, we keep households where the mother is always the "titular" of the cash transfer. Third, households with children aged 15 or above are also excluded from the sample. This is done to avoid having multiple possible decision makers besides the parents. The resulting sample consists of 1.172 households, 29.3% of the original sample, 894 in the treatment and 278 in the control group. The number of children for whom we estimate the demand system is 2.060, divided in 1.589 treatment and 471 control 7 . Table 1 presents the means of various baseline (April/May 2005) child and household-level characteristics for eligible households in treatment and control villages. Given that almost all of the sample takes up the program, we can consider this to be an unconditional transfer. For recipients, this leads to an exogenous increase in the share of the household income controlled by the woman. The share of income she controls is not an argument of preferences, and conditional on total resources, it does not affect the budget constraint. The eligibility to receive a lump-sum transfer to start a non-agricultural business activity is also randomly assigned. Given that the take up rate is universal, this transfer can also be considered unconditional. Differently from the previous treatment, though, this cash transfer is not entitled to the mother, but to the household in general. Hence the eligibility to this grant identifies changes in household income that are not exclusive of female partners. Households and children in this sample are socio-economically disadvantage and, as we can see from the table, they are disadvantaged in a number of important ways. For instance, the baseline expenditure level is very low. If we turn the local currency units into US dollars shows that almost 80% of households have per capita expenditures that are below $1 per capita per day. The composition of food expenditures shows that a large proportion of consumption goes into staples (57%), and a much smaller proportions goes into animal products (17%) or fruits and vegetables (5%). These numbers suggest a lack of balance in nutrition. Furthermore, the vast majority of women have not completed primary school (87%) and the same goes for men (90%). Most of these families are young couples (around 32-33 years old), have on average 2.5 children in 2005, and approximately 70% of their children are in the 0-5 years age group. Only half of them own their land, few have access to running water (10-14%), electricity (33-37%) and toilet facilities (63-69%). Children in this sample have substantial health problem. For instance, 25% and 21% of them have, respectively, height for their age and weight for their age that is more than two standard deviations below that of a reference population.
Even though the assignment to treatment is random by construction, we assess the validity of this assumption for our sample by looking at the means differences of households in treatment and control villages for several baseline characteristics. In the original sample described in Macours et al. (2012) , they show that the random assignment works well, and as we can see, even in our sub-sample treatment and control villages are balanced at baseline on most dimensions. While we find some unbalanced variables, most of the normalized differences never exceed 0.25, which is the limit commonly used in the literature beyond which a linear specification is not appropriate. In order to control for such imbalances, in addition to individual and village controls, we include in any specification the baseline value of the dependent variable. This is particularly important for the two measures of Height-for-Age and Weight-for-Age.
Empirical implementation
Our aim is to test which mechanism(s) explain parental investment in their child development after receiving a large exogenous grant. Child well-being is our main outcome of interest. The demand for it is modelled by assuming separability of those goods that produce it, from the rest of consumption and labour supply. The first subsection discusses how we control for power structures at the baseline in our empirical analysis. The second subsection deals with the methodological issues that have been raised in the literature when one aims to identify the relationship of interest with data coming from a cash transfers program such as AAC (e.g. Attanasio and Lechene, 2002; Attanasio et al. 2012; . In our context, we are particularly concerned with the functional form of the demand system, price variation, power structure and the endogeneity of total expenditure.
As argued in the theoretical section, child development can be seen as the outcome of the resources invested by the parents on their children. If a cash transfers program induces parents to change their behaviour toward this important public good, this must be also because they have changed their behaviour regarding the use of the intermediate goods. Finding the same pattern of results in the analysis of the inputs can be seen as a robustness check for the validity of the mechanism(s) identified. Hence the third subsection is concerned with the methodological issues for an analysis of the inputs. In both three subsections the independent variables of interest are the treatment dummy z T , the education difference between parents z E and their interaction z T ×E . For the time 14 being, we follow the literature and refer to them as distribution factors. Later we show that AAC may have an effect on the preferences of the decision makers, which means that treatment is not, strictly speaking, a pure distribution factors as required by the theory.
Power structures at baseline
The treatment indicator constitutes an ideal distribution factor to test the hypothesis of unitary rationality. However, as it will be shown in the results, after running a standard test of income pooling we find no evidence that AAC shifted bargaining weight. Hence in order to examine the role played by power structures in affecting child development outcomes, we need to find a valid proxy for it. The interaction of this measure with the treatment indicator will allow us to see whether results are consistent with previous literature: that is, children of more powerful women are more likely to benefit more when women have larger resources at their disposal.
A variety of proxies for bargaining power have been used in the literature. Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990) use unearned income; Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) use shares of income earned by woman; Quisumbing (1994), Doss (1999) and Thomas et al. (2002) use various measures of assets of the spouses. All of these measures capture some dimension of bargaining strength, but as Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) explain it at length, they are likely to be problematic, either because of endogeneity concerns with respect to decision-making within marriage, or because a sound measure of bargaining should capture also some cultural aspects within a family. On balance, human capital differences between spouses are attractive indicators of bargaining power and are indeed commonly used in the literature (e.g. Gitter and Barham, 2008; Schady and Rosero, 2010; Cherchye et al., 2012b). First, differences in human capital are pre-determined and do not change after the introduction of the grant. Second, it is an endogenous variable in a model of marriage market selection, because it is potentially correlated with other unobservables that guides the selection of the partner. However, it is clearly exogenous to decisions made within marriage (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003) .
Although the assumption of a lack of correlation with unobservable characteristics cannot be tested directly, we show evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Table 2 reports means difference of baseline characteristics between households where the father has more or less education with respect to the mother. Like Table 1 , splitting the sample based on this variable produces two sub-samples that are almost statistically equivalent. Indeed there are few significant differences with economic meaning. Only two variables belonging to the children requires some discussion. Children in families where the father has a larger education have a larger measure of Height-for-Age and birth weight. In other words, they appear to be better-off than children whose father has lower education than the mother. Controlling for these measures allows us to minimize these baseline differences.
Analysis of the outputs: child development
The household demand for child development is determined by the problem we described in Section 2. The reduced form demand system takes the following flexible form:
where θ k is the k's measure of child welfare, z T is the treatment indicator, z E = 1(edu m ≥ edu f ) takes value 1 if the mother has at least the same level of education of the father and 0 otherwise 8 , z T ×E is the interaction term, f (x) is a function of total household resources and d is a vector of demographic characteristics including also the level of education of both parents. Note that in all specifications we control for a set of village dummies and their interaction with the function of total expenditure. This approach allows us to control for price differences when prices are not observed . To the extent that this is the correct specification of household behaviour, the parameter α 1 captures the non-income effect of AAC grant, α 2 controls for the pre-existing power structures in the household, and α 3 identifies how power structures channel the exogenous cash transfers toward child development. We use 10 available measures of child well-being. Each outcome is converted into a within-sample z-score by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the control group. Also, the sign on the BPI variable is reversed, so that for all outcomes positive and higher values correspond to better outcomes. Hence the coefficients on the distribution factors and the other covariates measure effect sizes in standard deviation units. Both the distribution factors and the demographic characteristics enter equation (11) additively. This assumption is arbitrary because nothing prevents these variables from affecting demands in a more complex manner. However, we did not find significant interaction effects between distribution factors and total expenditure. In other words, it appears that for our sample distribution factors affect the the intercept but not the slope of the Engel curves. Distribution factors could also affect price elasticities, but this is an investigation that cannot be done in our context.
We are interested in estimating the child-level intent-to-treat effect (ITT), across all outcome measures, and separately for subsets of five cognitive and behavioural outcomes and five health and motor outcomes. Allowing for a slight abuse of notation, we wish to recover the parameters α in equation (11):
Later in the robustness checks we discuss alternative proxies for power structures.
which are estimated by running seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for all (or a subset) of the outcomes, and use the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimates to calculate the standard error ofᾱ (Macours et al., 2012) . The identification assumption underlying this exercise is that:
where u k,z E reflects both the unobserved difference in child rearing practices in households with more or less powerful mothers and genetic differences between children. The assumption is that, controlling for the level of education of both parents and all other covariates, there is no systematic difference at the baseline in child rearing practices between children in those two types of households. This is the strongest assumption made in this paper and, as we saw before, its validity is assessed in Table 2 . Furthermore, the demand for child well-being is modelled as a function of total expenditure, under the assumption of two-stage budgeting. Parents first decide how much to allocate to c θ and then, conditional on total expenditure, how much to allocate to each component of these goods enhancing child development. Moreover, the residual u k in (11) can be interpreted as an unobservable components of tastes that affect the production of the public good θ. If taste shocks to the system that determines total expenditure are correlated to the unobserved shocks of each measure of children well-being, then total expenditure is endogenous in our system. Measurement error in total expenditure is also a likely cause of endogeneity. Hence we instrument household total expenditure with pre-treatment household non-food expenditures and its square. This is a common set of instruments used in the literature (e.g. Schady and Rosero, 2008) . Following the traditional approach, we are implicitly assuming that the measurement error in total expenditure is uncorrelated with pre-treatment non-food expenditure 9 . Under the assumption that heterogeneity in tastes is the source of endogeneity of total expenditure, pre-treatment non-food expenditure is a valid instrument if labour supply is separable from the rest of consumption. Importantly, this could be a weak instrument in a context where large transitory shocks, like the one generated by AAC, weaken the relationship between pre-treatment income and current total expenditure. However, in the robustness checks of Section 5 we show that our instruments satisfy the common requirements of strength.
The function of total resources f (x) in (11) can in principle take any form. However, this creates additional problems for the instrumenting approach due to the presence of non-linear terms in the demand system. The alternative strategy adopted in the literature is to follow a control function approach as proposed by Blundell et al. (1998) .
Accordingly, it requires the use of residuals of the first stage regressions for the log of total expenditure to control for endogeneity of this variable in (11) . Introducing a polynomial in the residuals as additional regressors in the structural models is the non-linear equivalent of the two-stage least squares estimator (Wooldridge, 2010) . This is the strategy that we adopt also in this paper, even if the preferred specification is at the end a linear function of x. The reason is that this allows us to compare more easily the performance of different specifications in the robustness checks. Note that the inclusion of predicted regressors in the model add extra-sampling variability which must be accounted for. In all specifications that are reported, the variance-covariance matrix is always re-estimated to account for this fact 10 .
Finally, if consumption and leisure are not separable in the utility function, not only income is not a valid instrument for total expenditure, but also the entire demand system is misspecified as one should allow to account for the effect of labour supply on the marginal utility of consumption. Hours of work should enter in their own right as a determinant of the demand system. In our context we decided to allow for separability between labour supply and public consumption because our sample is composed of very poor households whose labour supply decisions are likely to be inelastic to changes in their non-labour income. Moreover, this assumption is also tested in the robustness checks of Section 5.
Analysis of the inputs: child rearing practices & resource shares
Next, we estimate the household demand for intermediate inputs and analyse how this is affected by treatment and power structures. There are a number of "risk factors" that have been identified as important determinants of child development in the literature. These are: availability of micro-nutrients, inadequate stimulation, exposure to infectious disease, caregivers' mental health, and also food and non-food expenditures (see the review by Walker et al., 2007) . For the first set of inputs, except expenditure shares, we re-run equation (11) with the following dependent variables: a dummy for whether a child under 5 years old has received anti-parasite in the last 6 months, or vitamin A in the last 6 months, if there is pen and paper in the house, if somebody tells stories to the child, if the child has a toy in the house, if the child has been weighed in the last 6 months and the number of hours spent reading to child per week. For the analysis on expenditure shares, we proceed as follows.
Let ξ(x, λ(x, z; d, z) be the (new) system of demand equations resulting from program (3) subject to the budget constraint (1). The goods are now the share components of total expenditure. The dataset contains information on five aggregate commodities: (i) staples; (ii) meat and dairy; (iii) fruits and vegetables; (iv) other types of food; (v) non-food items. The descriptive statistics for these goods are given in Table 1 and 2. On average, 71% of household consumption goes into food consumption and only the remaining portion is spent on non-food. The dataset does not contain information on prices, but as before we follow Attanasio et al. (2012) and construct variables that account for price variations across villages.
We estimate a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QAIDS) (Banks et al., 1997) which allows for quadratic effects in total expenditure. There is a large literature, partly already cited, on the impacts of cash transfers on resource shares which highlights the importance of allowing quadratic effects on shares. The QAIDS system can be derived directly from a problem involving a unitary utility function, but it can also be derived in the context of a more general collective model with public goods, like the one of Section 2. However, in this case the shape of the demand functions is not obvious, even when the decision makers have preferences that would give rise to a QAIDS in the unitary model. In our application, we follow the recent literature and estimate a demand system that allows the effect of three distribution factors -treatment, education difference, and their interaction -and assume that they enter additively. For the same reason as before, these variables seem to affect only the intercept, not the shape, of the Engel curves, and hence we prefer this parsimonious specification. The model of interest takes the following form:
where s i is the share of commodity i in total expenditure on goods i = 1, . . . , n, and where x, z T , z E , z T ×E and d are as before. Since endogeneity of total expenditure is particularly problematic in this context, we estimate equation (12) with a control function approach where the instruments are, as before, the log of non-food expenditure (and its square).
Results
We divide this section in four parts. First, we present results for the first stage regressions on total expenditures which are used to generate the residuals that control for endogeneity in the structural regressions. Second, we investigate which mechanism(s) between the income effect, a shift in bargaining power or a change in preference/knowledge of child rearing practices, are more likely to explain how the injection of the cash transfers has improved child development. Third, we strengthen the findings from the previous section by investigating how parents eligible to the grant have changed inputs and the allocation of consumption goods into the production function of child development. Finally, we run several further robustness checks on both the output and input regression models.
In all specifications, except when we look at budget shares, we use a linear control for the endogenous total expenditures, instrumented with pre-treatment per capita non-food expenditures as explained before. For the analysis of the budget shares we use a quadratic control where total expenditure is instrumented in the same way. Finally we control for a large set of pre-treatment village, household and individual characteristics. Village characteristics include baseline community averages of the Height-for-Age, Weight-for-Age, TVIP score, participation in growth monitoring, and vitamin and de-worming intake, and municipal fixed effects. Household characteristics include the level of education of both parents, age of the household head, the number of household members and the fraction of members in five age categories. Finally, children characteristics include dummies for child gender and month dummies for child age, the years of schooling of the mother, baseline Height-for-Age, Weight-for-Age, TVIP score, and birth weight. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. Table 3 reports the first stage regressions for the log of total expenditures. These regressions include both the instruments and the other conditioning variables described above that enter the second stage. Except for the first column on the baseline data, the other regressions use pre-treatment non-food expenditure (and its square) as instruments. We find that together they are powerful in explaining total expenditure.
First Stage Regressions
Moreover, as we can see from the estimates, given the random assignment of the program, neither treatment nor the lump-sum transfers have any significant effect on total resources prior to the inception of the program in 2005. When the welfare program kicks in, this has a large and positive effect on total resources, which is drastically reduced as soon as the households stop receiving these transfers. This suggests that households spend the additional resources immediately as soon as they receive them. The lump-sum payment, on the contrary, has a lower initial effect but it is persistent two years after its introduction. This might be due to the fact that households benefited from these additional resources only too late compared to the time the first follow-up survey was collected. However, once a family receives these transfers, given that they are conditional on starting a business activity, this activity benefits the family persistently. In summary, these results indicate that both treatment and lump-sum have, as expected, a substantial effect on the level of household resources.
Test of the mechanisms
We begin our main investigation by estimating the total impact of the program on child development. This corresponds to the specification implemented by Macours et al. (2012) , except that now the estimates are restricted to households with only two "natural" decision makers. The regression results are reported in the first rows of Panel A and Panel B of Table 4 . The six aggregated measures of well-being are labelled as follows. First we consider all measures together; second we aggregate the variables into a subset of five cognitive and behavioural outcomes; third into five health and motors outcomes; finally all three subsets are re-aggregated excluding the outcomes where the parents can report instead of a completely objective measure taken directly on the children. If we compare our point estimates with those of the original paper, we observe that the latter are on average larger than the former. This tells us that large and extended families benefited more from the program than smaller and "natural" families, which is an indication that AAC was more beneficial for those households with stronger needs.
Next, the specification in the second rows of Panel A and Panel B controls for total resources of the family, which includes total expenditures, the cash from the grant, and various indicators of wealth. The rationale for this model is to isolate any non-income effects resulting from the program. In light of the literature on unitary versus non-unitary models of the households, this corresponds to a test of the income pooling hypothesis, which was formally stated in equation (8) of Section 2. This table clearly shows that, as soon as we control for total resources in 2006, the year in which eligible households received the cash, the treatment effect becomes much smaller and never significant. This is a strong evidence against the hypothesis that AAC improved child development via a shift in bargaining power of the mother, and in favour of the idea that the program acted via an income effect. Note that this might indicate also that AAC did not change preference/knowledge of child rearing practices neither. However, later we show that households receiving the treatment actually modified their behaviour toward the children, which appears not to be picked up here.
The parameters of the interaction between treatment in 2006 and education difference are all positive, although never significant. The interaction captures the working of a mechanism that is still not picked up significantly during the year of the injection of the cash. However, when we look at 2008, the underlying mechanism driving the improvement in child development becomes much clearer. The interaction term remains positive but now it becomes stronger and significant in most cases. This result indicates that children living in households where the mother was already strong at the baseline benefited more by the cash transfers. This is even clearer once we split the sample in two groups: the first group being the households where the education of the father was larger than that of the mother (z E = 0, mothers weaker at the baseline), and the second group being the households where the education of the mother was equal to or larger than that of the father (z E = 1, mothers stronger at the baseline); and then re-run the same system of equations (11) separately on these two sub-samples. Panel A and B of Table 5 present the effect of the treatment for each of the six aggregated measures of well-being as before, in both years, and for the same set of specifications of before. As we can see, the program impacts were actually not even significant for children in households with weaker mothers at the baseline, but was very beneficial for those children living with already strong mothers. Notice, as soon as we control for total resources, the program impacts disappear 11 .
These empirical findings have a clear theoretical interpretation in light of the model that we presented in Section 2. Indeed they reject the hypothesis that targeting mothers leads to an increase in their bargaining power within the family. Moreover, the positive heterogeneous program impacts indicates that mothers have a larger marginal willingness to pay for children well-being with respect to fathers, but this larger taste is effective only in those households where the balance of power already favoured them before the starting of the program. Note that, at this stage, a natural question may arise. Powerful mothers had a strong decision power already before the program started. Why is the parameter attached to education difference not significant across the six aggregate measures of child well-being? Or in other words: why do children in households with strong mothers are not better off and become so only after their family receives the subsidy? This question is precisely answered by the mechanism that we have identified. Before the program these families were very poor and had not enough resources to spend on their children. When the program kicks in, they experience a strong income effect which brings them out of the poverty line. But it is only the households where the mother is strong, and above the poverty line, that start to invest in children in a significant way.
Finally, even though the effect of the program disappears once we control for total resources, we cannot completely exclude that AAC did not affect child development through a change in preferences or knowledge of the parents thanks to the informational campaign. In order to test this hypothesis, we would require a sample of households for which bargaining issues and power structures are completely absent. A sample of singleheaded households satisfies this requirement (for a similar strategy, see Shady and Rosero, 2008; Angelucci and Attanasio, 2012) . However, the number of female-headed households for which information on the various measures of child development are reported is too small to have reliable estimates. Hence we investigate this alternative channel only in the next subsection, when we estimate a standard demand system using information on resource shares.
Robustness: Test of the mechanisms on the inputs
Child development is a public good in the household and it is "produced" by combining various intermediate goods. Table 6 reports estimates of system (11) where now the dependent variables are seven different measures of child rearing practices. The treatment effect is positive and very strong but we fail to detect any significant heterogeneous program impacts with respect to mother's power. This suggests that, at least concerning child rearing practices, all treated households have significantly improved their behaviour toward their children, regardless of their ex ante power structures. This might be in contradiction with our analysis on the outputs. However, when we turn our focus on budget structures, a different picture emerges. Table 7 , 8 and 9 report estimates of the Engel curves based on equation (12) for the full sample, households with weak mothers, and households with stronger mothers, respectively. The specification controls for several covariates at the household and community level as before, and also for price variation. The system is estimated using a control function approach where the residuals, estimated in the first stage, enter as polynomial of second order. As we can see, the treatment indicator has an effect in the reallocation of the budget in 2006, but not in 2008, whereas the lump-sum indicator is significant in both years. Interesting for the purposes of our exercise is the joint significance test of the parameters of the treatment variable on both sub-samples with weak and strong mothers. At the bottom of each regression in Table 8 and 9 we report the p-values of this test. As we can see, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected only for the sub-sample of households where the mother is stronger at baseline, and it fails to be rejected for households where mothers are weaker. The result of this test suggests that we detect a significant change of the overall budget structure only for those households with powerful mothers. In light of the results we presented in the previous section, this result tells us that when the mother was already strong at the baseline, she was better able to best use the additional resources that were at her disposal.
Finally, to investigate a change in preference/knowledge of the parents following the program, we run the same system (12) on a sample of slightly more than 50 single-headed households. Table 10 reports the results. As we can see, even if the sample is small, there is a strong evidence in favour of a reallocation of resources even where the mother is the unique decision maker. This has to be taken as an indirect evidence that AAC program had a strong effect on preferences and knowledge, which is in sharp contrast with the results on singles of similar CCT programs. The model cannot tell us why this is the case, hence we can only look at differences in the design of the program to infer why this might be the case. AAC was designed specifically to improve child development in poor families and was implemented with a strong informative campain on the importance of having a balanced and nutritious diet. The relevance of the topic, i.e. improving child development, might have induced parents to pay more attention to the information provided and to put effort in changing their behaviour for the good of their children.
Further robustness checks
In order to consolidate the validity of our results, we perform several robustness checks 12 .
First, given that our sample restrictions were very severe, we might be worried that the power analysis is weakened and regressions on our sample are not able to pick up the underlying program impacts. In the Online Appendix attached to this paper, we report the estimates of specification (11) on the six aggregate measures of child development both for the original sample and for the original sample divided in two sub-samples based on the education difference of the parents. The point estimates are of course different but the two most important qualitative results remain. First, the program impacts disappear once we control for total resources. This is a strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the program benefited children of the whole sample mainly through an income effect. Second, children in households where the mother was more powerful at baseline benefited more from the cash transfers. This is again very much evident once we split the sample in two, based on the pre-existing power structures, and re-run the same set of regressions. Second, our measure of pre-existing power structures is a dummy taking value 1 if the mother has at least the same level of education of the father and 0 otherwise. The choice of this functional form was motivated by the existing literature (e.g. Schady and Rosero, 2008) . Other proxies are of course possible. For instance, instead of a dummy we could take more continuous variables like the absolute difference or the ratio between years of education of the parents (e.g. Gitter and Barham, 2008) . By running the same set of regressions, both for the outputs and for the inputs, with either of these two alternative measures of power structures, we obtain the same qualitative results, even though the estimates are slightly weaker. We take these results as an indication that the choice of the dummy variable is better at picking up the underlying mechanism. In principle we could also use other measures besides education differences which are also exogenous to decisions made within marriage and that capture some cultural aspects of the family. Age difference is a potential candidate. Unfortunately information on the age of the mother are not available in the original dataset. Other proxies are also not possible to use as there are no other information available.
Third, to assess the sensitivity of the mechanisms identified, we use the third treatment of AAC as the new treatment and re-do all the estimations on our sub-sample and on the sub-sample splitted based on education difference. In other words, z T is now a dummy taking value 1 if the household received the lump-sum transfer, on top of the conditional subsidy, and 0 otherwise. Both the effect of the treatment, α 1 , and its differential effect with respect to education, α 3 , have a positive sign but not significant both in 2006 and 2008. This means that the reception of a large, one shot, payment did not improve child well-being more than the impact of the pure cash transfers. This evidence was used by Macours et al. (2012) to argue that the improvement in child development cannot be due only to a pure income effect. In light of the empirical results obtained so far, we might argue that it is not entirely appropriate to look at this kind of treatment to establish whether the effects of a CCT program on child development is driven by an income effect. Moreover, the ownership of this lump-sum transfer was not given to the mother specifically, but to the household. Hence it is more difficult to argue that this money was at her disposal. Note that there is still one caveat in these results. The sample selection made to obtain our sample cut 2/3 of the original sample. Hence it might still be that the lump-sum had a differential effect but this is not picked up because the power of the analysis is now weaker.
Fourth, to consolidate the idea that the results are not driven by the level of education of the parents, or by their differential ability to understand the use of the money received in the program, we re-run specification (11) and (12) for all our sub-samples by adding an interaction term between treatment and level of education of the parents. The overall differential effect of the program is slightly smaller but still positive and significant. This is again to highlight the fact that we are picking up the differential effect of this exogenous subsidy induced by the different power structures in the family.
Finally, the issues related to instruments used for the control function approach, the choice of the order of the polynomial for the residuals to control for endogeneity of total expenditure, the functional form of total expenditure f (x) and the check that labour supply of the decision makers have not changed during the year of the program, are all interlinked and have been subject to further investigation. First, we re-ran all the specifications, both for the outputs and for the inputs, with pre-treatment total expenditure (and its square) as instruments for log of total expenditure. Results do not change. Second, we re-ran all the specifications using different proxies for wealth as instruments. These are mostly dummy variables: a dummy for whether the household owns its land, number of rooms in the households, whether they have electricity, water and toilet facilities. We tried different combinations but the power of these joint instruments is weaker than the preferred instruments. The estimates have the expected sign but are slightly weaker. In principle, an even better set of instruments for total expenditure would be either income of the family or some more aggregate measures of agricultural wage as explained in Attanasio and Lechene (2002; . Unfortunately these information are not available in the dataset. Third, we checked that the results are sensitive to higher orders of polynomials of the residuals and we opted for the second order, as no changes in the estimates, both for the output and input analysis, are observed when we add higher orders. Fourth, for the analysis of the outputs we re-ran the regressions with quadratic expenditure, but the parameters attached are never significant, whereas for the analysis of the budget shares, we use quadratic expenditures because estimates change if we run an AIDS rather than a QAIDS. Finally, the dataset provides information on the total number of days worked by the mother during 2006 and 2008. We observe no change in this variable following the introduction of the program. Information on the number of days worked by the father are not available in the dataset.
Conclusion
Scholars have estimated a positive causal effect of CCT programs on child development in developing countries. However, the mechanism(s) through which this may occur is less well understood. The simplest possible explanation is that by providing poor households with additional income may relax their budget constrain and allow them to move along the Engel curve. A higher level of child development observed following a program such as AAC may simply be rationalized as an income effect. A further alternative explanation, that would still not invalidate the representation of the household as unitary entity, is that such welfare programs are usually combined with informational campaigns that might fill the knowledge gap that poor households in remote areas have with respect to better child rearing practices. Hence an improved development in child well-being may be the result of a change in their preferences toward how to raise a child. Finally, it may well be the case, as postulated by several papers, that the gender of the recipient of such cash transfers matter because mothers have stronger preferences toward children than fathers, and household resources are not pooled as the unitary model suggests. Transferring the grant to the mother may change the balance of power in the household and in turn induce a re-allocation of goods that better represent their taste.
In the present paper we investigate which mechanism(s) are more likely to explain the observed improvements in child development that followed the injection of large transfers to a sample of households. In order to accomplish this task, we use a dataset collected to evaluate the effect of a cash transfer program in Rural Nicaragua. The objective of the program was to provide households with additional resources in order to improve child well-being. This dataset is suitable for a variety of reasons. First, the program was targeted to woman in a randomized fashion as most of the CCT programs that have been implemented. Moreover, since the program was implemented to affect child well-being, it contains very detailed information on the production of this public good. The empirical analysis is divided in two parts. Firstly, we estimate a demand system of child well-being on different samples. By controlling for total resources, we primarily test whether the program has any residual and significant effect on child development. Then, we split the sample in two according to the initial relative bargaining difference between spouses. We lack a direct measure of their bargaining power, however we use a common valid proxy which is education difference. Secondly, we re-estimate the same system of equations on various measures of child rearing practices and separately a demand system on household resource shares. Finally, we re-run the same specification on a sample of single-headed households which allows us to estimate the effect of the program in an environment where bargaining issues are absent.
There are three main findings. First, the decision process that leads to the production of child well-being is not affected by a shift in bargaining power of the mother. Indeed the effect of the grant disappears once we control for total resources, which indicates that the program acted via a strong income effect. Second, this does not imply that power structures are not playing a role in the way cash transfers improves child development. We find strong evidence that AAC have heterogeneous program impacts with respect to the bargaining power of the mother at baseline. Stronger mothers at the beginning of the period were more able to use the new available resources and to better invest them in their children. Finally, there is evidence that knowledge and preferences of the eligible decision makers change after the introduction of the grant. Both findings are strengthened by an analysis of the inputs. Indeed the same qualitative results hold when we estimate a classic household demand system with resource shares. Notes: Means are computed for two groups of households and children (on the top): on the left, households where the mother has a larger or equal level of schooling with respect to the father; on the right, households where the education of the father is larger than that of the mother. The right most part shows the difference in means and the significance level. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. Notes: Coefficients for index of family outcomes are estimated with SUR. The six aggregated measures of well-being are labelled as follows. First we consider all measures together; second we aggregate the variables into a subset of five cognitive and behavioural outcomes; third into five health and motors outcomes; finally all three subsets are re-aggregated excluding the outcomes where the parents can report instead of a completely objective measure taken directly on the children. The first specification, labelled "Without total resources", corresponds to the specification ran in Macours et al. (2012) . The specification labelled "With total resources" controls for the level of education of the parents, together with all other controls as specified in Section 5. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for clustering at the community level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Coefficients for index of family outcomes estimated with SUR. The six aggregated measures of well-being are labelled as follows. First we consider all measures together; second we aggregate the variables into a subset of five cognitive and behavioural outcomes; third into five health and motors outcomes; finally all three subsets are re-aggregated excluding the outcomes where the parents can report instead of a completely objective measure taken directly on the children. The first specification, labelled "Without total resources", corresponds to the specification ran in Macours et al. (2012) . The specification labelled "With total resources" controls for the level of education of the parents, together with all other controls as specified in Section 5. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for clustering at the community level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The three aggregated measures of child rearing practices are labelled as follows. First we consider all measures together. Second we aggregate the variables into a subset of four outcomes: a dummy for whether a child under 5 years old has pen and paper in the house, if somebody tells stories to child, if has a toy in the house and the number of hours spent reading to child per week. Third we aggregate the variables into a subset of three health outcomes: a dummy for whether a child under 5 years old has received anti-parasite in the last 6 months, if has received vitamin A in the last 6 months and the number of days in bed for illness in the last 30 days. All specifications controls for the level of education of the parents, together with all other controls as specified in Section 5. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for clustering at the community level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for index of family outcomes estimated with SUR. The six aggregated measures of well-being are labelled as follows. First we consider all measures together; second we aggregate the variables into a subset of five cognitive and behavioural outcomes; third into five health and motors outcomes; finally all three subsets are re-aggregated excluding the outcomes where the parents can report instead of a completely objective measure taken directly on the children. The specification labelled "With total resources" controls for the level of education of the parents, together with all other controls as specified in Section 5. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for clustering at the community level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients for index of family outcomes estimated with SUR. The six aggregated measures of well-being are labelled as follows. First we consider all measures together; second we aggregate the variables into a subset of five cognitive and behavioural outcomes; third into five health and motors outcomes; finally all three subsets are re-aggregated excluding the outcomes where the parents can report instead of a completely objective measure taken directly on the children. The specification labelled "With total resources" controls for the level of education of the parents, together with all other controls as specified in Section 5. Standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for clustering at the community level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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